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I. INTRODUCTION
A long overdue public outcry over the inattention and inaction of
local governments to the problem of domestic violence in this country
led, throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, to many changes in the
way those governments viewed and approached the problem.' Most
recently, the O.J. Simpson case threw open the doors for a national dis-
cussion concerning violence among family members.2 As legislatures,
1. During this time, 48 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation
designed to modify official behavior. Such legislation, often the result of the
interplay of pressure from feminist groups, actions of concerned legislators, and
professionals in the criminal justice system, has markedly changed the underlying
legal philosophy toward the problem of domestic violence.
EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 12
(1990).
2. The media coverage surrounding the double-murder "trial of the century" has had an
enormous impact on public perception of the problem. "Polls show that, in 1991, 57 percent of
Americans thought spouse abuse was a serious problem. Today, 96 percent do." Alfred Lubrano,
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law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary scrambled for responses to
the problem, a number of laws, policies, and institutional practices
emerged across the country. 3
This Comment does not challenge the notion that changes in the
way government and courts viewed the crime of domestic violence were
unavoidable and necessary. Instead, the success of the judicial
responses, both legislatively mandated and self-adopted, and the price
paid in the process of changing, are examined. Specifically, this Com-
ment focuses on pretrial criminal protective orders, often issued as a
condition of pretrial release for defendants in domestic violence cases.
For those jurisdictions that allow for such orders through legislation, a
number of important issues emerge. The concerns that must be
addressed in critically examining criminal protective orders have broad
applicability to other important areas of the criminal justice system's
response to the domestic violence defendant.4
The need for critical examination of the legislative and judicial
responses to domestic violence and their effect on defendants' rights is
acute. Indeed, while the volume of literature concerned with docu-
menting the enormity of the problem and suggesting an assortment of
curative measures has markedly increased in the past decade, academic
analysis of the impact these measures have on the domestic violent
defendant is virtually nonexistent. What commentary has emerged has
been mostly the work of students. This Comment's primary purpose is
to encourage a more exhaustive inquiry into the impact the movement to
Nicole's Legacy: Shedding Light on Domestic Violence, NEWSDAY, June 12, 1995, at 16 (quoting
Marissa Ghez, Family Violence Prevention Fund, San Francisco). See Haya El Nasser & Andrea
Stone, For Women, a Dire 'Awareness': Domestic Abuse Calls are Spiraling, U.S.A. TODAY,
July 27, 1994, at 3A (documenting a nationwide increase in reported incidents of domestic
violence based on media attention towards the Simpson case, and reporting related legislative
responses in California and New York).
3. As of September, 1991, nineteen states and the District of Columbia were in the process
of organizing gender bias studies or implementing resulting recommendations. Karen
Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on
Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247-48 (1993).
4. It is outside the office of this Comment to examine many of the other recent changes in
the law which also implicate defendants' rights. Among these changes, for example, are
mandatory arrest policies for police responding to domestic violence calls, and "no-drop"
prosecution policies for states' attorneys who subsequently prosecute domestic violence cases.
Both approaches raise concerns addressed in this paper, and both deserve and have received
(albeit to an unsatisfying degree) critical analysis in their own right. See generally Angela
Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to
Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDAM L. REv. 853 (1994) (advocating widespread adoption
of no-drop prosecution policies based on perceived benefits); Donna M. Welch, Comment,
Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43
DEPAUL L. REv. 1133 (1994) (opposing general mandatory arrest laws based on perceived
disadvantages, including loss of victim autonomy).
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address domestic violence has had on the group with which most advo-
cates seem least concerned (i.e., the defendants). Similarly, I hope that
those legislative and judicial bodies currently at work in fashioning a
jurisdictional response to the issue will benefit from the analysis and
recommendations contained herein.
Part II of this Comment addresses criminal protection orders gener-
ally and explores the problem of holding domestic violence defendants
prior to release. Part III examines some of the many questions regarding
the issuance of criminal protection orders, such as: from where does the
power to issue such orders derive?; what class should be protected by
such orders?; what evidentiary standard should apply?
Part IV describes some of the release conditions that may be
imposed upon a defendant subject to a criminal protection order and
raises the problems with prosecutorial, judicial, and alleged victim dis-
cretion in determining those conditions.
Part V of this Comment looks at the procedural requirements of
criminal protection orders and examines the interests at stake in their
issuance. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the problems and issues
presented and makes concrete recommendations to both courts and leg-
islatures addressing the criminal protection order question.
A particular point should also be made by way of introduction. The
common masculine references to the defendant in domestic violence
cases are a reflection of the fact that the great majority of alleged domes-
tic violence batteries are perpetrated by men5 and that the bulk of the
literature on the subject refers to defendants in domestic violence case as
men. 6 Such references are not meant to suggest that men are exclusively
the defendants in such cases, nor that women are always the victims.7
5. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 808 n.3 (1993) (95% of all
adult domestic violence victims are women); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 10 (1991).
6. For an exception, see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1407 (1991) (examining the criminal implications of
violating a civil protection order).
7. One area where commentators are observing a marked increase in reported domestic
violence committed by men against men and women against women is in the homosexual
household. See, e.g., CLtAE M. RENZETrI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN
RELATIONSHIPS 17-19 (1992) (contending domestic violence in a lesbian household occurs more
frequently than in a heterosexual household); Jane Furse, Calls For Help are Ignored in Gays'
Domestic Violence, TImsS-PCAYUNE, Dec. 12, 1993, at A10 (estimating that 500,000 gay men
and between 50,000 to 100,000 lesbians annually are battered by their live-in companions).
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II. CRIMINAL PROTECTION ORDERS
A. Criminal Protection Orders Generally
A criminal protection order ("CPO") is often issued as a condition
of pretrial release where there has been an arrest in a case involving
domestic violence.8 For those jurisdictions that have specifically legis-
lated to empower criminal courts to issue such orders,9 judges will make
the CPO a condition of the bail offered to a domestic violence defendant.
The conditions contained within the CPO itself, by which the defendant
must abide, may be numerous, and the discretion accorded to judges in
deciding when to issue a CPO and which conditions to include will vary
by jurisdiction.
The CPO is distinguished from the civil protection order, which is a
civil remedy afforded to individuals, usually women, through a specific
petitioning process. A civil protection order is appropriate where no
arrest has been made in connection with an alleged incident of domestic
violence, yet the victim voluntarily seeks assistance from the courts.' 0
Civil protection orders often impose upon an alleged batterer many of
the same conditions imposed upon a criminal defendant and have gener-
ally withstood constitutional challenges." In a criminal action, where a
CPO would be issued, the state is a party and there is an impliedly
higher standard of proof.' 2
The comparison between criminal and civil orders of protection is
8. Defining what action constitutes "domestic violence" is, in itself, an endeavor wrought
with controversy. See Laurie K. Dore, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of
Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 665, 674 n.34 (1995) (attributing wide
variations in domestic violence statistics in part to the difficulty in defining the crime). For the
purposes of this Comment, "domestic violence will be defined as violence between heterosexual
adults who are living together or who have previously lived together in a conjugal relationship."
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1, at 9. The definition among jurisdictions, scholars, and judges
as to what actions constitute domestic violence is by no means a settled issue. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ch. 741.30 (1992) (encompassing only those criminal offenses resulting in physical injury or
death); Lisa G. Lerman, Statute: A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J.
ON LEis. 61, 71-72 (1984) (defining domestic violence to include theft of property belonging to
another).
9. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/112A-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 530.12 (McKinney 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.26 (Anderson Supp. 1994); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-23 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5 (Supp. 1995).
10. For an exhaustive survey of the law of civil protection orders, see generally Klein &
Orloff, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982); Boyle v. Boyle, 12
Pa. D. & C.3d 767-68 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 993 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
an action brought under a statute for civil injunctions codified under the state criminal title was
not subject to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof for criminal actions because the
state was not a party and the action was, by its very nature, civil).
[Vol. 50:919
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inevitable. An obvious and facially persuasive argument used by those
courts and commentators opposed to the systematic issuance of criminal
orders of protection is that relief is already universally available to
alleged victims via the petitioning process in the civil arena. 13 Even so,
the distinction between the two types of orders is sometimes blurred or
confused.' 4 Indeed, a violation of a civil protection order will often be
prosecuted as a criminal contempt charge.' 5
B. Holding Defendants Prior to Release
Many commentators feel that the unique nature of the crime of
domestic violence, where the parties are not strangers, warrants extreme
measures concerning temporary denial of bail to defendants charged in
domestic violence cases, and some courts and legislatures have
responded to this argument.' 6 For instance, in North Carolina, where a
judicial officer determines if the immediate release of a domestic vio-
lence defendant will be dangerous 17 to either the alleged victim or
13. "Statutes and case law in all states and the District of Columbia provide that the adult
abused party may petition the court for an order of protection." Klein & Orloff, supra note 5, at
842-43. Where there is an established method of obtaining temporary protection from an alleged
batterer, and the method requires an affirmative request for protection by the alleged victim, the
judicial officer issuing the civil protection order is assured of the petitioner's sincerity and
cooperation in the process. See infra part III.F.
14. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 8 (suggesting a model state domestic violence statute
combining criminal and civil remedies); Klein & Orloff, supra note 5, at 948 (citing a criminal
case striking down substance treatment as a condition of bail for proposition that such conditions
may be available via the civil protection order process). For a general discussion on the collapsing
distinction between civil and criminal law, see Cheh, supra note 6.
15. In a decision producing no less than five separate opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that a subsequent criminal prosecution for conduct originally resulting in a criminal contempt
conviction for violating a court order to refrain from domestic violence was not violative of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
In a factually similar case decided under the virtually identical language of a state constitution's
double jeopardy protection, the Supreme Court of Hawaii refused to follow the majority holding
of Dixon. State v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150 (Haw. 1994). The court affirmed the dismissal of a
circuit court charge following conviction of a family court charge arising from the "same
conduct." Id. at 157. "[W]e conclude that the interpretation given to the double jeopardy clause
by the United States Supreme Court in Dixon does not adequately protected individuals from
being 'subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.' " Id. at 155. For criticism of the
Dixon rationale, see Kirstin Pace, Note, Fifth Amendment-The Adoption of the "Same Elements"
Test: The Supreme Court's Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants from Double Jeopardy, 84
J. CrM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 769, 801-04 (1994) (advocating a "same transaction" test for
determining applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause and concluding that such a test would
have barred the subsequent prosecution of the domestic violence defendants in Dixon).
16. An extreme and unusual example involved a defendant arrested for a domestic violence
battery alleged to have occurred four days earlier, who was held without bond and with no filing
of formal charges for 24 days. Martina v. State, 602 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
17. The concept of the dangerousness of the criminal defendant has not always been central to
the rationale for pretrial release. For an examination of the change in emphasis in bail
determinations from the traditional appearance-orientation model to the more contemporary public
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another person, the officer "may retain the defendant in custody for a
reasonable period of time while determining the conditions of pretrial
release."'" Other statutes are not as open ended. In Utah, a person
arrested for a domestic violence offense may not be released prior to
"the close of the next court day following the arrest," unless the release
is conditioned upon either a court order or written pledge barring the
defendant from any contact with the alleged victim. 19 A provision in the
same act requires an alleged victim to waive in writing any court
required "stay-away order," or else a defendant is automatically barred
from returning to his home.2°
Many advocates of domestic violence law reform praise such legis-
lation as necessary for combatting domestic violence crimes. 2' They
contend that domestic violence often involves unbridled emotion in the
form of rage, and for that reason a mandatory "cooling off" period is
needed to insure against recurring violence upon release. 22  This
assumes that all situations resulting in an arrest involve such rage, and
such an assumption precludes an examination of the factual conditions
of each arrest. This approach is facially inconsistent with the constitu-
tional requirements of bail determination, which compel courts to make
a case by case determination of whether a reasonable foundation exists
safety rationale, see John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail
Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 17 (1985) (noting that over one-third of the public
safety-oriented bail laws provide no definition of what constitutes danger).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(l) (Supp. 1995).
19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). A Friday arrest would
presumably mean that a defendant could not be released before the end of business on the
following Monday, absent the court order or pledge.
20. Id. § 3(a).
21. See Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response To Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 320 (1985) ("States
should adopt a law that provides that batterers can be held for twenty-four hours or over the
weekend without bail being set.").
22. Professor Waits apparently sees all alleged batterers as fitting a singular uniform profile.
"Once in custody, batterers need time for the rage of the severe battering phase to subside." Id.
The belief that all arrests resulting from alleged domestic violence incidents require a singular and
powerful criminal justice response is pervasive in the academic writings on the subject. See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498,
1523-24 (1993) ("Treatment of the assailant may ultimately protect the victim in lasting fashion,
but in the individual case, immediate incapacitation is often the safest and most pressing recourse,
and the most effective at achieving preventive goals .. "). Such a viewpoint is certainly easier to
adopt than one which treats domestic violence defendants in the same way other criminal
defendants are treated: as individuals charged with a crime arising from particular circumstances.
Alternative approaches have been suggested. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC & FAMILY
VIOLENCE § 208(1) commentary at 11 (Conrad N. Hilton Found., Model Code Project of the
Family Violence Project, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 1994) (suggesting
courts considering pretrial release of a domestic violence defendant should "review the facts of
the arrest and detention and ... evaluate whether the accused poses a threat to the alleged victim
....."); see also infra parts IIl.C and V.A.
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for denying or revoking bail.23 Legislation designed to protect against
recurring domestic violence through initial denial of bail must be true to
this constitutional mandate.
III. ISSUANCE OF CRIMINAL PROTECTION ORDERS
A. The Power and Discretion of Courts
The power of the criminal courts to make determinations concern-
ing bail is well grounded in both legislative and judicial history. Ques-
tions arise, however, when the judiciary creates conditions to pretrial
release that are imposed through both civil and criminal protection
orders. While the specific functions of the governmental branches are
difficult to point out, and in some cases overlap,24 separation of powers
concerns are often raised where an undue amount of judicial discretion
has been granted by state legislatures. 25 The concern in regard to protec-
tive orders, both criminal and civil, is that the judiciary takes on a quasi-
legislative role in defining what otherwise lawful conduct becomes
criminal if engaged in by a domestic violence respondent/defendant. 26
In response to this valid concern, legislatures can and should specifically
define the options available to a judicial officer in fashioning reasonable
conditions of release, and appellate courts can ensure that lower court
determinations are both constitutionally sound and within the scope of
judicial powers.27
23. See Carbo v. United States, 288 F.2d 282, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds
369 U.S. 868 (1962).
24. See State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 234 (Mo. 1982) (upholding the
delegation by the state legislature to the state courts of the power to define the terms of civil
orders of protection).
25. A court should not, for example, be allowed to impose conditions upon the subsequent
parole of a convicted criminal defendant as this power lies exclusively with the executive branch.
State v. Beauchamp, 621 A.2d 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
26. [T]hese [civil] statutes often proscribe acts that are not criminal. Since the court,
in effect, is creating criminal offenses by the terms of the order-creating
essentially personal criminal codes, if you will-not only must the order survive the
requirements of specificity and clarity that apply to criminal statutes, but it also
must be within the court's authority and must constitute a reasonable exercise of
discretion.
Cheh, supra note 6, at 1407.
27. The danger of an overreaching judiciary is omnipresent, especially in matters as
politically charged as the issue of domestic violence. "If the judiciary were given the general
power to randomly select and define action(s) as criminal, guided only by the 'shall be to protect
the petitioner' language [of a civil protection order statute], it would violate the Missouri
constitution." Marsh, 626 S.W.2d at 234.
Similarly, separation of powers issues may arise when the legislature is seen as
commandeering the inherent role of the judiciary in response to a particular political climate. See,
e.g., Christopher B. Daly, Judge Draws a Powerful Weapon; Special Rhode Island 'Gun Court'
Takes Aim at Firearms-Related Crime, WASH. PosT, Feb. 24, 1995, at A03 (describing the legal
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Laws empowering courts to condition release of a domestic vio-
lence defendant on the issuance of a CPO vary widely as to the discre-
tion allowed to those courts in determining the conditions. Minnesota,
for example, allows for a judge to impose any conditions of release, 28
while Alaska, and many other states, set out a specific list of conditions
from which a judge may choose.29 Where a broad license is provided to
the court to fashion any condition for release the statute may be in viola-
tion of either the state or federal constitutions.3 0 Therefore, legislatures
must ensure that particular conditions are set out for judicial application.
B. Defining the Protected Class
Determining exactly which individuals may be protected by the
issuance of a CPO has proved challenging to both legislators and judges.
"The definition of a victim of domestic violence frequently has been the
most controversial issue in legislative debate of the abuse laws."31 Con-
servative legislators do not wish to be seen as condoning cohabitation
and similar nontraditional living arrangements, 32 while more liberal leg-
islatures continue to expand the definition of those persons worthy of
protection under a domestic violence statute. 33 Where a statute specifi-
challenge to a legislatively created specialized court designed to deal exclusively with firearms
related crimes).
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 Subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1996).
29. The Alaska statute mandates that:
[T]he court shall consider the following conditions and impose one or more
conditions it considers reasonably necessary to protect the alleged victim of the
domestic violence or stalking, including ordering the defendant (1) not to subject the
victim to further domestic violence or stalking; (2) to vacate the home of the victim;
(3) not to contact the victim other than through counsel; (4) to engage in counseling
... ; (5) to refrain from the consumption of alcohol or the use of drugs.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025(a)(l)-(5) (Supp. 1995).
30. "[C]ourts cannot ... make law like a legislature does .... [I]t is most difficult for the
people to challenge unlawful acts of the judiciary. So a court exceeding its power is the most
grievous violation of constitutional law there is." Kiefer v. State, 762 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Ark.
1989) (Hickman, J., concurring) (contending that portions of the judicially promulgated rules of
criminal procedure overstepped the court's state constitutional authority).
31. Lerman, supra note 8, at 75.
32. Id.
33. The District of Columbia city council recently expanded the use of restraining orders in
domestic violence cases to include "socially intimate relationships." Stephanie Mencimer, D.C.
Council Backs Major Law, Court Reforms, LEGAL Tirmrs, Nov. 7, 1994, at 1. In New Jersey, the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 to 33 (1995), originally
promulgated in 1982, was amended in 1991 to expand the class of protected citizens eligible for
civil protection orders to include almost any nonstranger. See Id. § 25-19(d).
The amendment is gender-neutral and is expansive enough to include a same-sex,
non-related cohabitant or former cohabitant of a household. This broader class ...
includes lesbians and gays who are presently cohabiting as a non-traditional family
with or without children, or who have previously cohabited in a homosexual
relationship.
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cally sets out the class of individuals to be covered by domestic violence
legislation, a court must not unduly expand the statute by an order in
favor of an alleged victim that the legislature did not intend to protect.34
In New Jersey, a court construed the state's civil protection law35 as
applying only where there was some indicia that petitioner and respon-
dent had shared a home together,36 and denied petitioner relief where the
couple "never, in any sense of the word, shared a household. '37 Cer-
tainly, the decision of a court to impose a CPO as a condition of release
must likewise be at least partially based on the relationship between the
defendant and the alleged victim. More importantly, perhaps, a court
must consider the current living arrangements of the alleged victim and
batterer in fashioning an appropriate order.
C. Fact-Finding by the Courts
It is fundamental to our traditional notions of fairness that a court
must make a factual inquiry into the basis and circumstances surround-
ing an arrest for domestic violence. The law of Minnesota compels a
judge to review the facts surrounding arrest and detention,38 and the
comparable criminal statute in New York requires the court to "make a
determination" that imposition of a condition to pretrial release is war-
Hon. Mac D. Hunter, Homosexuals as a New Class of Domestic Violence Subjects Under the New
Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 31 U. LouIsvuLE J. FAM. L. 557, 558
(1993). An example of legislation that has progressively expanded the class protected is Minne-
sota's Domestic Abuse Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 Subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1996). It was
noted that the 1994 version of the statute extended protection to a wide variety of individuals but
excluded individuals who neither live together nor had a child in common. Margaret C. Hobday,
Note, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of Intimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic
Violence Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1285, 1293 n.45 (1994). See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01 Subd. 2(b) (West 1990). The most recent version of the statute, however, includes
"persons ... who have resided together in the past ... [and] persons involved in a significant
romantic or sexual relationship." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 Subd. 2(b)(4), (7) (West Supp.
1996).
34. Ohio, for example, provides for protection of "persons who are cohabiting and are not
married...; persons who are not married and are not now cohabiting, but who cohabited within
one year of the offense; persons who are not married, never were married, who did cohabit at one
time, not necessarily within one year, but who are the natural parents of a child; and former
spouses," as well as current spouses. John P. Christoff, Ohio's Domestic Violence Laws:
Recommendations for the 1990's, 19 OHio N.U. L. REv. 163, 169 (1992). Such defined
parameters provide courts with a clear understanding of legislative intent and require no additional
judicial construction.
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 to 33 (1995). The New Jersey Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991 provides for "both emergent and long-term civil and criminal remedies and
sanctions . I..." d. § 2C:25-18.
36. Croswell v. Shenouda, 646 A.2d 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
37. Id. at 1146.
38. "The judge before whom the arrested person is brought shall review the facts surrounding
the arrest and detention." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 Subd. 2(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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ranted.39 As important as making a factual inquiry into the allegations
surrounding an arrest is the concern that a court make a specific state-
ment, for the record, giving the reason for the issuance of a CPO.4" The
New York law provides that a court "shall state such determination in a
written decision or on the record, whether to impose a condition [to
release]."41 The reasons for such a requirement are obvious. Where a
legislature requires that a court not merely inquire into the factual foun-
dation for issuing a CPO, but also requires that those reasons appear on
the record, reviewability of that decision by a higher court is necessarily
enhanced. More importantly, however, defendants are assured that their
cases will be examined on a case by case basis and that a CPO will not
be issued as a matter of course, but after careful consideration.42 A
defendant has a right to know the reasons for any deprivation or
infringement upon his personal interests. Where the state excludes him
from his residence, for example, the reason should be explicitly set forth
by the court.
D. The Standard of Order Issuance
A defendant's general right to bail (except in the most serious
cases) is derived from the Eighth Amendment and is codified in most
state constitutions.43 However, a general presumption of release without
condition, or release upon the least onerous condition or conditions
available to the court,"4 applicable to criminal defendants generally, has
not survived the changes in domestic violence law.
A CPO may be issued under current state statutes, for example,
39. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 530.12(5)(a) (McKinney 1995) states:
[i]n making such determination, the court shall consider, but shall not be limited to
consideration of, whether the order of protection is likely to achieve its purpose in
the absence of such a condition, conduct subject to prior orders of protection, prior
incidents of abuse, extent of past or present injury, threats, drug or alcohol abuse,
and access to weapons;...
40. "[E]ven where an exercise of discretion is operative there must, as a matter of law, be
underlying facts which will support that exercise either in denying bail or fixing the amount of
bail." People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 255 N.E.2d 552, 555 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that the trial
court erred in denying bail outright to defendant without clear statement as to the reasons).
41. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 530.12()(a) (McKinney 1995).
42. The New York courts have subsequently softened the clear language of N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 530.12(1)(a) (McKinney 1995), in one case holding that "[a]lthough a statement of such
findings and conclusions is desirable, it is not constitutionally required in support of a bail
determination, as long as the reasons for the determination are apparent from the record." People
v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 766 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., 1989). Cf. In re York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 771,
779 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the imposition of a special condition to defendants'
pretrial release on their own recognizance required an individual determination and showing of
facts that such a condition was warranted in each case).
43. For a general discussion see Goldkamp, supra note 17, at 7 n.26.
44. Id. at 12-14.
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when reasonably necessary to protect the alleged victim,45 when release
without condition would be inimical to public safety,46 when the safety
and protection of the petitioner may be impaired,47 and where there is
possible danger or intimidation to the alleged victim or another.48 Con-
versely, some statutes enabling courts to issue CPOs for domestic vio-
lence offenses are silent as to the standard of issuance a court should
apply,4 9 apparently leaving such a determination to the established judi-
cial rules concerning bail. Those states that do not set out a standard of
issuance leave open the possibility that such orders will be issued as a
matter of course, with no inquiry by the court as to the basis of the
CPO.50
The relatively low threshold for issuance of a CPO can be con-
trasted with the standard for issuance of an ex parte civil protection
order which may require an "immediate and present danger of abuse."' t
Of course, in a criminal context probable cause will exist to presume
that abusive conduct has occurred, and thus, a lower threshold for issu-
ing a protective order may be warranted. Courts should nevertheless
apply a cognizable standard even in the criminal arena, since in practical
terms the resulting deprivations to the criminal defendant and the civil
respondent are the same.
E. Evidentiary Standard for Criminal Protection Orders
Courts have differed as to what standard of proof to apply in cases
where a CPO is sought. However, what is clear is that the traditional
45. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025(a) (1995).
46. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 Subd. 2(a) (West Supp. 1996).
47. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C) (Anderson Supp. 1994).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(l) (Supp. 1995).
49. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-23 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5
(Supp. 1995).
50. The Massachusetts experience in issuing civil protection orders is instructive on this
point. The legislature established the "Domestic Violence Recordkeeping System," a registry
designed to assist judges in determining whether or not to issue a civil protection order by
providing the criminal history of the alleged batterer. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A,
§§ 1-10 (Supp. 1995). During the first year following enactment of the supposedly curative
statute, 50,874 restraining orders were issued at a rate of about 1,000 per week. "Some judges
report that fear of deadly consequences has resulted in the automatic issuance of preliminary
restraining orders without weighing the merits of the complaint." The Domestic-Violence
Registry, MAss. LAWS. WKLY., Apr. 11, 1994, at 10. Carefully evaluating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the issuance of any protective order, criminal or civil, and making
those findings known in cases where an order is issued, while perhaps less efficient, is more
consonant with traditional notions of fairness. See Preventing Domestic Violence, MASS. LAWS.
WKLY., Oct. 12, 1992, at 10 (suggesting fine-tuning new domestic violence statute to ensure
equitable treatment of alleged batterers).
51. State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982) (construing Missouri's
Civil Protection Statute, Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.085.3 (1980)).
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evidentiary standard of proof for criminal proceedings-beyond a rea-
sonable doubt-is not to be employed. "Reasonable factual support" for
the issuance of a protective order prior to trial, as applied by a New
York court in People v. Forman,52 amounts to a preponderance of the
evidence standard usually employed in a civil context. The determina-
tion as to what standard to apply generally has been left to the courts by
the legislatures who have passed domestic violence criminal protection
legislation. 3
The Forman court touched on, but refused to decide, whether a
higher standard of proof might be constitutionally compelled. "[T]he
court does not determine in this case whether a finding of a danger of
intimidation or injury to complainant need only have reasonable factual
support in the record ... or, whether a higher evidentiary standard is
required under the Fourteenth Amendment to support defendant's con-
tinued exclusion from his home. ' 54 The question of whether a higher
burden should attach where a constitutionally protected interest is at
stake in a criminal proceeding is a valid one. In fact, where no statutory
burden of proof is mandated by a legislature at all, the failure to impose
such an evidentiary standard could, in itself, constitute a deprivation of
due process under the Constitution.55 Courts have not, on the whole,
taken this question seriously, but the issue deserves greater attention as
the universe of judicial options for the victims of domestic violence,
both civil and criminal, expands to address the problem.
F. Petitioner Requirement for Criminal Protection Orders
While a civil order of protection will by definition be sought by a
specific petitioner, usually the alleged victim of domestic violence, most
statutes authorizing court issuance of a CPO do not require a specific
petitioner as a condition of issuance.56 In Illinois, the state's attorney
must file a CPO petition on behalf of and naming the alleged victim. 57
The Ohio statute allows for the person who made the arrest to file on
52. 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 759 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., 1989).
53. It has been suggested that a legislative adoption of a preponderance standard of proof for
hearings on CPOs would not violate the due process rights of criminal defendants. See Lerman,
supra note 8, at 94.
54. Forman, at 759 n.l.
55. See State v. Naegele, No. 90-920, 1980 LEXIS (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1980) (raising,
but not deciding, the question).
56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 (West Supp.
1996); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 530.12 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-534.1 (Supp.
1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-23 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5 (Supp. 1995)
(although an alleged victim may waive the required CPO). Id. § 2.5(3)(a).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/112A-2(a)(i) & (ii) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995).
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behalf of the "complainant"58 and even allows the court, sua sponte, to
issue a temporary protection order as a pretrial condition of release. 59
This Ohio law was challenged in Ohio ex rel. Mormile v. Garfield
Heights Municipal Court,60 where from late October, 1991, to May,
1992, a husband and wife repeatedly petitioned the trial court to remove
a condition of the husband's release on a domestic violence charge that
he vacate his marital home.6" The appeals court upheld the trial court's
actions, even where neither the wife nor the arresting officer had
requested the order as a condition to bond.62
Requiring a petitioner for the issuance of a CPO raises the issue of
alleged victim input and the proper weight to be afforded the alleged
victim's wishes. The issue raises strong feelings among experts and
advocates in the field. Professor Waits, for example, asserts that "[a]
good rule is that her views should be accorded great deference when she
wants the law to take action against the batterer, but should be given less
weight when she says she wants to protect him."63 Such a standard is
anathema to a sound judicial inquiry into the facts of a particular case.
Applying such a rule amounts to a reverse form of the well-documented
gender bias of American courts.6' It would simply be another incarna-
tion of traditionally paternalistic judicial attitudes meant to minimize the
free choice and empowerment of women. In adopting such a standard, a
court would effectively be telling the alleged victim of a crime that her
input is unwelcome because the court knows better than she does what
58. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1994). Ohio allows for
warrantless arrests by law enforcement where the alleged victim signs a statement claiming
violence has recently taken place in the household. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(2)(a)
(Anderson Supp. 1994). Many jurisdictions, however, have enacted mandatory arrest legislation
which does not involve seeking input from the alleged victim. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT.
§ 133.310(6)(a) (1993). As of 1990, nine states had mandatory arrest policies for misdemeanor
domestic violence offenses. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1, at 96. The many issues which
emerge from mandatory arrest legislation are outside the scope of this paper. See discussion supra
note 4.
59. Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(D) (Anderson Supp. 1994).
60. 607 N.E.2d 890 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), appeal dismissed, 602 N.E.2d 249 (Ohio 1992).
61. Id. at 890.
62. Id. at 890-91.
63. Waits, supra note 21, at 307. The supposed reasons for such a rule are (1) the law is
obliged to deter batterers even where the victim refuses to pursue deterrence; (2) when the
battered woman takes legal steps her actions are consistent with legal goals; (3) a victim who
expresses disinterest in deterring a batterer does so from learned helplessness; (4) a battered wife
is more likely to minimize than exaggerate her husband's brutality; (5) where she seeks harsh
penalties her personal safety probably rests on the outcome. Id.
64. See generally The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth
Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 745-1106 (1994); John J. Curtin Jr.,
Combating Gender Bias, 77 A.B.A. J. 8 (1991); Judith Resnick, Gender Bias: From Classes to
Courts, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2195 (1993); see also supra note 3.
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happened and what is best for her family. 65 Courts that allow for issu-
ance of COPs that condition release upon requirements such as staying
away from the alleged victim or staying out of a shared residence, and
do so without knowing, or in opposition to, the wishes of the alleged
victim may be doing more to create a problem than to solve one.
IV. CONDITIONS OF CRIMINAL PROTECTION ORDERS
A. Court Discretion
Statutes vary widely on the discretion allowed to a court as to
which conditions to include or consider in a CPO, or even whether or
not to issue one at all. Alaska, for example, provides for no discretion in
the consideration of the possible conditions for a CPO. 66 The statutes of
Ohio and Minnesota, on the other hand, allow for discretion in imposing
any terms in an order but do not mandate which conditions must be
considered by the court.67 The most common condition of a CPO is a
"no contact" order, where the defendant is prohibited from contacting
the alleged victim. Neither Utah's 68 nor South Dakota's law allows for
judicial discretion, mandating that a no contact condition be part of any
issuance of bond in domestic violence cases.69
A mandatory no contact condition is the recommendation of the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges as well, 7° and has
65. An often cited and extraordinary example of judicial paternalism is Justice Bradley's
concurring opinion in a nineteenth century case in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld as
constitutional an Illinois Supreme Court ruling barring women from being licensed as attorneys.
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 130-33 (1872). In arguing for the prudence of a per se
rule restricting women, Justice Bradley argued "[tihe paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And
the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based
on exceptional cases." Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring). For an interesting discussion
regarding gender equality and judicial paternalism, see Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to
False Equality: Judicial Assaults on the Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1518, 1522 (1986) ("In the nineteenth century, as today, the choice between equal treatment
and different treatment for women could not be made in the abstract, but only in context, case by
case.").
66. "[T]he court shall consider the following conditions and impose one or more conditions it
considers reasonably necessary . . . ." ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
67. Minnesota's law states "the judge may impose any conditions of release that will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person for subsequent proceedings, or will protect the
victim of the alleged harassment or domestic abuse .. " MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 Subd. 2(b)
(West Supp. 1996). Ohio's law states "the court may issue a temporary protection order, as a
pretrial condition of release, that contains terms designed to ensure the safety and protection of the
complainant ...." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C) (Anderson Supp. 1994).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1)(a) (Supp. 1995).
69. "If bond for the defendant in any domestic abuse action is authorized, a condition of no
contact with the victim shall be stated and incorporated into the terms of the bond." S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-23 (1992).
70. As quoted in EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING
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received support from commentators and judges alike.71 A pretrial pro-
cess containing a no contact requirement, however, can be objectionable.
Where no discretion is allowed or no fact-finding is made by a court, the
worth of the alleged victim in the process is minimized and the potential
for an unjust deprivation of the defendant's rights is increased. Jurisdic-
tions that allow for such a condition, but do not mandate it, provide for a
more flexible and procedurally sound determination by their courts.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
Where a court lacks either the legislative empowerment or the incli-
nation to assume the role of petitioner for CPOs, that role may fall on
the prosecutor. In San Francisco, for example, the prosecutor of a
domestic violence case will automatically request a stay away order at
the defendant's first appearance, unless the victim specifically indicates
that she does not want one. 2 Alternatively, a jurisdiction may decide
not to solicit the alleged victim's input at all, instead placing the deci-
sion solely upon the prosecutor's office, and in some instances removing
any discretion and mandating that the state's attorney request a CPO.73
Whether legislatively mandated or institutionally created, a system that
minimizes or ignores alleged victim input and fails to examine the par-
ticular facts of a domestic violence case poorly serves both the alleged
victim and the criminal defendant.
C. Conditions of Criminal Protection Orders
The conditions specifically allowed by state statutes that permit
courts to issue CPOs are varied. The most common is a condition
prohibiting further acts of abuse by the alleged batterer against the
alleged victim."4 Such a condition is uncontroversial and seemingly
innocuous as a prerequisite for release. More serious questions are
raised by the issuance of a CPO that requires a defendant to stay away
CRIMINAL JusTICE RESPONSE 168 (1992). Cf. Lerman, supra note 8, at 106 (discussing model
legislation which lists, but doesn't mandate, a no contact/stay-away order as an available form of
relief).
71. A mandatory no contact order is apparently the institutional practice of the courts, for
example, in Westminster, Colorado, which employs an accelerated docket for domestic violence
cases and where a condition of all bonds requires that a defendant be removed from the premises
where the incident occurred and have no contact with the victim. Fredric B. Rodgers, Develop an
Accelerated Docket for Domestic Violence Cases, 31 JUDGES' J., Summer 1992, at 2, 6.
72. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 70, at 169.
73. Such is the recommendation in section 4.04 of Lerman's Model Code. Lerman, supra
note 8, at 104. Section 4.04(A) reads: "Upon the filing of any criminal action involving domestic
violence, the prosecuting attorney shall request by motion that a protection order be issued as a
condition of pretrial release ... ." Id.
74. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.30.025(a)(1) (1995); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/112A-
14(b)(l) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(2)(b) (Supp. 1995).
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from the home of the alleged victim.75 Where the parties are not cur-
rently cohabitating, such a condition is less burdensome upon a defend-
ant than where the issuance of the CPO results in the exclusion of the
defendant from property he would otherwise be lawfully allowed to pos-
sess and enjoy. 76
Other possible conditions of pretrial release for a defendant in a
domestic violence case may involve staying away from the school, busi-
ness, or workplace of the alleged victim,77 or may preclude the defend-
ant from any contact with the alleged victim whatsoever.78 Mutual
orders of protection exist where a court conditions the release of a
defendant on the parties' having no contact with each other. While at
one time popular in both civil and criminal proceedings, these mutual
orders have become generally discouraged and are now rarely used.79
The defendant also may be ordered to refrain from molesting,
removing, or using the personal property identified in the CPO, 80 even
where the court fails to inquire into who possesses the right to use or
holds title to that property. A final condition that may be included in a
CPO states the terms under which a defendant may visit his or her
child.8' Where the possible permissible conditions to be included in a
CPO are set out by statute, the discretion of the court is minimized and
concerns of creating a "mini-criminal code" are mitigated. Where a
court can fashion any sort of condition to a CPO, the potential for over-
burdening the rights of a presumably innocent defendant are increased.
V. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Criminal Protection Order Hearings
There are a number of procedural requirements that must be met
when a criminal defendant is deprived of a constitutionally identified
right or liberty interest. Foremost among these is the right to a hearing
75. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025(a)(2) (1995).
76. See discussion infra part V.C.
77. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1)(a) (McKinney 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-534.1(a)(2)(a) (Supp. 1995).
78. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-23 (1992) makes such a "no contact" condition
mandatory for pretrial release.
79. Mutual orders for protection should not be issued as a matter of course as they are
difficult to enforce and send the wrong message to the victims of domestic violence that they are
equally to blame. Chief Justice A. M. Keith, Domestic Violence and the Court System, 15
HAMLINE L. REV. 105, 113 (1991). Such orders can be made available where both parties file for
such an order. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.050.20 (1980). For an extensive discussion of mutual
orders of protection, see Czapanskiy, supra note 3, at 253 n.17.
80. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a)(2)(c) (Supp. 1995).
81. See, e.g., id. § 15A-534.1(a)(2)(d).
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concerning the deprivation.82 In those jurisdictions that have legislated
to allow the issuance of criminal protective orders, the approaches to the
hearing issue have been varied. North Carolina 3 and Utah,84 for exam-
ple, have enacted statutes that are silent on the subject of holding a hear-
ing to determine the propriety of issuing a restrictive CPO, presumably
leaving the question to their respective judicial systems. 85 Conversely,
Ohio's law8" specifically requires that a hearing concerning whether or
not to issue the CPO occur within twenty-four hours of the filing of a
motion that requests its issuance.
Where no legislative guidance is provided concerning whether to
have a hearing, or in what form that hearing should take place, courts
have nonetheless found that hearings are constitutionally compelled. In
People v. Derisi,7 a New York court found a domestic violence defend-
ant was entitled to a hearing on his continued exclusion from his home
and personal possessions following the issuance of a CPO. a8  While the
statute under which the CPO had been issued did not expressly mandate
that a hearing be held,89 the court found that other provisions of the state
code compelled the issuing court to allow for a hearing when the defend-
ant challenged the CPO.90
The right to be heard in cases where a CPO has been or will be
issued is important, 91 yet it is certainly distinct from the right to an evi-
dentiary hearing on the need for such an order. In People v. Forman,92
another New York court, passing on the same statute at issue in Derisi,
held that not only was a hearing necessary but that a "defendant, by
counsel, was entitled to present facts and law in opposition to the [CPO]
application."93 The New York statute, in fact, requires that "[s]ufficient
82. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides "nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. "[S]ome kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his
property interests .. " and likewise "a person's liberty is equally protected. ... Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1 (Supp. 1995).
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5 (Supp. 1995).
85. Neither state's judicial system has, to date, passed on this question.
86. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C) (Anderson Supp. 1994).
87. 442 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1981).
88. Id. at 908-09.
89. 1980 N.Y.Laws 530 § 12.
90. Derisi, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
91. There is an old saw that a man's house is his castle. If modem times will not
permit him moats and battlements, it still remains, I strongly suspect, that the
constitution insists that he be allowed, except in exceptional circumstances, a few
words before the sheriff escorts him out the door.
Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 111 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (opinion by Reynolds, J.).
92. 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Crim. Ct., 1989).
93. Id. at 762.
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facts must be present to enable the court to make a determination 'on the
basis of the available information.' 94
When courts construe vague or incomplete legislation to require an
evidentiary showing on the part of the prosecution seeking a CP0 , and
allow a defendant to present a case in opposition of that order, funda-
mental notions of due process are upheld."
In practice, however, many courts empowered to issue CPOs as a
condition of pretrial release may be disregarding the requirement of a
hearing.96 Where a statute is silent as to the necessity and right of a
hearing, and where CPOs are continually issued absent a meaningful
judicial inquiry, the integrity of the justice system is compromised.
Jurisdictions must draft appropriate legislation to ensure that where dep-
rivations of liberty interests97 of domestic violence defendants take
place, the primary procedural safeguard of a hearing is offered and con-
ducted in a meaningful manner.
B. Other Procedural Concerns
Apart from the requirement of a hearing, defendants in domestic
violence cases should enjoy the same protections and procedural safe-
guards afforded to all criminal defendants charged with similar crimes.98
Where a CPO is issued, for example, a defendant is entitled to a clear
and definite statement99 as to the conditions of that order, as well as
notice as to its issuance. Any legislature empowering criminal courts to
issue CPOs should make such requirements explicit in a statute, because
94. Id. (citing the statute).
95. "'Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense.'"
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (quoting American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156, 168 (1932)).
96. In describing the benefits of an accelerated docket for domestic violence cases in
Westminster, Colorado, for example, Judge Frederic B. Rodgers makes no reference to the
necessity of a hearing either before or after the issuance of an order. Such an order prohibits a
defendant from returning to the scene of the alleged incident, usually his home. These orders are,
incidentally, issued as a matter of course in all cases involving domestic violence in that
jurisdiction. Rodgers, supra note 71. The same lack of a hearing and notification to a defendant
as to the right to a hearing was observed by the author during the summer of 1994 in the daily
workings of the Dade County, Florida, Domestic Violence Court. This court likewise issued
CPOs in virtually all cases, without prior factual inquiry, as a condition to pretrial release.
97. See discussion infra section V.C.
98. To deny this assertion would be to ignore not the only constitutional guaranty of due
process but the notion of equal protection expressed in the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and included in many state constitutions, as well. The concern of equal protection by
courts and commentators in the arena of domestic violence, however, has historically been limited
to the rights of the victims of that violence. See, e.g., BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 70, at 93-
99 & 158.
99. See Cheh, supra note 6, at 1405 (suggesting the application of the same standard to civil
protection orders with criminal contempt proceeding resulting from a violation).
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a violation of a CPO implicates the future liberty interests of a defendant
and an unclear or unarticulated order increases the likelihood of a viola-
tion and subsequent arrest or prosecution for criminal contempt.
Utah's Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act,'00 for example, requires
that where a defendant is arrested for domestic violence,'0 ' the arresting
officer must provide both the alleged victim and batterer with a written
notice of the automatic requirements of the CPO statute, which includes
a mandatory no contact provision.10 2 While the judge or magistrate must
thereafter issue written findings and determinations following the
defendant's nonwaivable first appearance, 10 3 the statute does not require
that the defendant be provided with a copy of any court order ultimately
issued. By failing to require that a copy be presented to the defendant,
the statute leaves such notification to the discretion of the court issuing
the order. An amended Minnesota statute'0° requires that the defendant
be served with a copy of the CPO, but also specifically states that failure
to do so does not invalidate the conditions of the order.' 0 5
Such provisions work to deny a defendant the adequate notice nec-
essary to ensure compliance with a CPO and implicate serious due pro-
cess concerns. Legislation and court proceedings allowing for both civil
and criminal protection orders should, therefore, include a clear state-
ment of the conditions being imposed upon a defendant which should be
presented to the defendant prior to release. The duration of the CPO
should likewise be made clear to the defendant upon release.
Legislation that allows for the issuance of CPOs should also state
specifically that such an issuance is not admissible as evidence of guilt
in the eventual trial for the crime charged. The vast majority of state
statutes relating to CPOs, however, contain no such procedural safe-
guard.'0 6 One notable exception is Ohio's statute 0 7 which ensures that
a temporary CPO issued as a condition of pretrial release "[s]hall not be
construed as a finding that the alleged offender committed the alleged
100. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 to 8 (Supp. 1995).
101. "Domestic violence" is narrowly defined as a criminal act against a "cohabitant," but
seemingly includes any activity separately defined by statute as criminal. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-36-1(2)(a)-(n) (Supp. 1995) (including in the definition of domestic violence the "discharge
of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the direction of any person, building or vehicle
."). For a discussion of the problem of properly defining the crime, see supra note 8.
102. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(7) (Supp. 1995).
103. Id. § 77-36-2.6(3) (Supp. 1995). For discussion of requiring courts to make specific
findings of fact, see Part III.C, supra.
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 Subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1996).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.025 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.72 (West Supp.
1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-23 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5 (Supp.
1995).
107. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(E)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1994).
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offense, and shall not be introduced as evidence of the commission of
the offense at the trial of the alleged offender on the complaint upon
which the order is based." 108 Including such a provision in CPO legisla-
tion is essential to maintaining fairness in judicial systems that so often
issue such orders automatically in all domestic violence cases. 10 9
C. Interests and Rights of Defendants at Issue
No examination of the issues surrounding criminal protective
orders is complete without an analysis of the defendant's rights and
interests in cases where a CPO is issued. Victim advocates are often
anxious to minimize, or even deny, the domestic violence defendant's
rights. They may fear that recognition of the principle that the basic
protections guaranteed to all criminal defendants should apply equally to
those charged with domestic violence, would compromise and curtail the
progress made in combatting the problem. A recognition of the interests
in question and the applicability of the constitutionally mandated protec-
tions to these cases does not necessarily lead to this result, and should
nonetheless operate outside of these collateral concerns.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
prohibit the federal government and any state from arbitrarily depriving
any person, including the criminal defendant, of property or liberty.110
The interest at risk of deprivation via the process in question must be
considered by the court poised to impose the deprivation. The United
States Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,"' considered this ques-
tion after a worker was denied a hearing before the termination of his
federal disability benefits. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court set out a test that came to apply to the states as
well, and that has been employed by courts in examining deprivation of
property rights in domestic violence cases.112 The Court enumerated
four factors to consider in determining whether a deprivation imposed
108. Id. This statute has been cited as influential in proposed legislation. See Lerman, supra
note 8, at 104.
109. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Indeed, such is the recommendation of
Professor Christoff in his analysis of the same Ohio statute. Christoff, supra note 34, at 194.
110. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
..... U.S. CONST. amend. V; "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law;..." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1.
111. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
112. For example, in Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763 (W.D. Wis. 1988), the
considerations undertaken by the Mathews Court were used to analyze the respective rights at
issue in a domestic violence case. The federal district court, in construing a Wisconsin statute
authorizing ex parte civil protection orders, expressed concern that, while Mathews provided a
mechanism for identifying and weighing rights, the case was silent on what specific procedural
protections best addressed those rights. Id.
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by a state comports with the guarantees of due process. The first factor
is the private interest that will be affected by the state's action. t1 3
Unless the interest at issue meets the threshold requirement of being
constitutionally protected, however, procedural concerns such as a
meaningful hearing are not implicated. The other factors include the
risk of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional safe-
guards, and the interest of the state government at issue.I" When acting
to deprive a domestic violence defendant of a liberty or property interest,
therefore, a court considering issuance of a CPO must first identify and
consider the interest in order for the deprivation to be constitutional.
What a court may define as a properly held property interest has
been broadened," t5 and sometimes limited t t6 over time. It is beyond
dispute, however, that an individual has a property interest in the enjoy-
ment of his personally owned or leased property. Courts that have
passed on the constitutionally of civil protective orders have consistently
held that depriving someone of the use and possession of his home
directly implicates a constitutionally recognized property right.," 7
The U.S. Constitution requires that the property interest be weighed
against the state's interest. A tension develops between the state's legiti-
mate police power in protecting state citizens and the individual's right
to possess and enjoy personal property." 8 Identifying that the tension
exists is the first step in fashioning an appropriate order. Courts, by
dispensing with procedural protections designed to facilitate the
informed consideration of the rights at stake in a particular case, often
113. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
114. Id. at 335.
115. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (finding a property right contained in a
public educational scheme created by Ohio and holding that the temporary deprivation of such a
right via suspension, even where short, is still a serious event worthy of procedural protection);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (finding a property interest in statutorily created
welfare benefits); see generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
116. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.) ('The types of
'liberty' and 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause vary widely, and what may be
required under the Clause in dealing with one set of interest which it protects may not be required
with another set of interests."), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974)
117. In Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763 (W.D. Wis. 1988), the court explicitly
recognized such a right, finding that under "the Mathews factors, it is apparent that substantial
procedural protections are mandated by the strength of the [alleged batterer's] interest in his home
.... " See also Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 109 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("[T]here would be
little room to argue that temporary deprivation of one's home is not a deprivation of an interest
encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due process protection"); State ex
rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 230 (Mo. 1982).
118. See, e.g., Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767, 773 (1979) (upholding the Pennsylvania
civil protection order statute). "[W]e hold that the act in question validly employs the police
power of the Commonwealth, in a reasonable manner, to abate a well recognized and widely
spread social problem .... The restrictions that the act places on the use of property to protect
abused spouses ... are necessary to dispel the dangers of domestic violence." Id.
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fail to make factual inquiries into the living status of the parties to a
domestic violence case, or fail to inquire into the property interests the
defendant and alleged victim hold in a particular home. When this
occurs the proper balance between the rights and duties at issue can not
be found.
Not surprisingly, however, most statutes allowing for CPOs do not
require that courts make such an inquiry. The exception is the Illinois
CPO statute. 1 9 This enactment sets out, as one of the remedies to be
afforded in a CPO, a grant of exclusive possession and use of a resi-
dence to an individual that the court has preliminarily found to have
been abused. 2 ° Such a grant is made only where the alleged victim has
a right to occupy the residence or household, which is defined in the
same section,' 2 ' and where both the alleged victim and defendant have a
right to occupancy, only after balancing the hardships to each, with the
presumption of greater hardship to the petitioner/alleged victim.' 2 2
The Illinois law, which applies in both criminal and civil settings,
goes a long way to ensure a judicial inquiry into the property interests
involved takes place before the criminal defendant/civil respondent is
excluded from his residence. Jurisdictions that do not provide for such
an inquiry risk creating a system where courts issuing CPOs fail to con-
sider the property rights of the parties to a domestic violence case, in
obvious violation of constitutional protections. 123
A defendant's interest in his property is by no means the sole inter-
est at issue when a court considers a CPO. For example, the reputation
119. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/112A-14(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995).
120. Id.
121. A party has a right to occupancy of a residence or household if it is solely or jointly
leased by that party, that party's spouse, a person with a legal duty to support that
party or a minor child in that party's care, or by any person or entity other than the
opposing party that authorizes that party's occupancy ....
Id.
122. If petitioner and respondent each has the right to occupancy of a residence or
household, the court shall balance (i) the hardships to the respondent... resulting
from entry of this remedy with (ii) the hardships to petitioner ... resulting from the
continued exposure to the risk of abuse (should petitioner remain at the residence or
household) or from loss of possession of the residence or household (should
petitioner leave to avoid the risk of abuse) ... The balance of hardships is presumed
to favor possession by petitioner unless the presumption is rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence, showing that the hardships to respondent
substantially outweigh the hardships to petitioner ....
Id. § 14(b)(2).
123. The Wisconsin statute considered in Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763 n.4 (W.D.
Wis. 1988), although purely civil in application, takes notice of the constitutional problems of
indefinitely denying the rightful and sole owner of a residence the right to possession and
enjoyment of that property. See Wis. STAT. § 813.12(3)(am) [sic] (1994) (allowing, but not
requiring, a judge to limit an alleged victim's possession of a residence in which she holds "no
legal interest" to "a reasonable time until [she] relocates").
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of the defendant, 24 as well as the custody1 25 and visitation 126 rights of
the defendant with regard to his children, are other general liberty inter-
ests that a court issuing a CPO must consider. As in the case of property
deprivations, however, very few jurisdictions require that courts con-
sider these interests when issuing the orders that burden them. Where
legislation does not require meaningful review and balancing based on
the facts of an individual case, judges may be all too willing to ignore
these safeguards.1 27 Leaving to the discretion of a court what import, if
any, to place upon an interest held by the domestic violence defendant
cheapens the same interests held by the entire community. 2  A legisla-
ture is uniquely positioned to make a statement in favor of preserving
the presumption of innocence and procedural protections for all citizens,
in the same way it may make a powerful statement concerning the pro-
tection of all citizens from abuse in domestic settings. By setting out in
the language of a statute, all the interests that a court must consider in
fashioning the best conditions for pretrial release in domestic violence
cases, lawmakers can ensure that a reasoned decision, insulated from the
political pressures of the day, and particularly suited for the parties
involved, is a just and best result.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issues that emerge in an analysis of criminal protection orders
124. " 'Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him,' the minimal requirements of the [due process] clause must be
satisfied." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
125. See State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 230 (Mo. 1982) (holding that there
is a liberty interest in the custody of one's children).
126. See, e.g., Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that
"interference with [defendant's] visitation rights is significant," but justifiable given statutory
procedural safeguards, where an ex-parte civil protection order forbidding a domestic violence
defendant from communicating with his ex-wife resulted in denial of his right to visit his
children).
127. Judges may be uncomfortable issuing ex parte [civil] orders which evict the
offender from the residence or award custody without the opportunity to be heard,
but sometimes this must be done .... Property, custody, and due process rights of
persons who have jeopardized the safety of others should yield to an expedited
hearing.
Judge Linda Dakis, Injunctions for Protection, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at 49.
128. It has been suggested that the factors for judicial consideration set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), have created an environment where the full impact of a judicial
burden upon a significant interest will often be ignored. "This focus on the practical
consequences of the deprivation, in conjunction with the Court's apparent callousness, suggest
that only when the deprivation is perceived as implicating a necessity of life will the factor carry
much weight in the calculus." Nadine Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic Violence
Situations: Alternative Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 95, 109
(1980).
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transcend the parameters of the orders themselves. The concern for the
rights of defendants in domestic violence cases must involve a careful
scrutiny of the legislative, executive, and judicial responses to what is a
unique and frustrating crime.
It has been the purpose of this Comment to identify some of the
issues that must be addressed in measuring the efficacy and fairness of
those responses, and to make concrete recommendations for judges and
legislators who are creating and applying new approaches to an old
problem.
First, and most obvious, courts must make factual findings, explicit
in the record, when issuing criminal protective orders, for both ensuring
reviewability by appeals court and providing for a better fact finding
process.
Both courts and legislatures must take affirmative steps to ensure
evidentiary rules in the CPO process are specifically set out and fol-
lowed. Legislation allowing for CPO issuance should include a safe-
guard barring that issuance as evidence in a subsequent criminal trial.
This should not be left to court discretion where many courts have insti-
tutionally adopted the practice of systematically issuing CPOs as a mat-
ter of course, without inquiry into the specifics of each case.
Furthermore, where courts apply a civil "preponderance" evidentiary
standard and place the burden upon a domestic violence defendant to
show unreasonableness in release conditions, they unconstitutionally
blur the time honored distinctions between the two fora and ignore the
differences between the two types of proceedings.
Specifically legislating the statutory burden of proof required in
hearings concerning criminal protection orders would provide needed
guidance to the courts deciding such issues and better comport with due
process requirements. Courts generally have not passed on the question
of whether there is a higher evidentiary standard and where the burden
of persuasion falls for evidentiary hearings regarding the issuance of
criminal protective orders, yet these questions are critical to proper
administration of justice and require immediate and careful
consideration.
Procedurally, where a legislature fails to specifically provide for a
hearing due to a defendant against whom a criminal protection order is
issued, courts should imply such a provision into the statute to ensure
that due process requirements are met. In practice, legislatures should
use the Illinois CPO statute' 29 as a model concerning defendants' right
to use and retain possession of property. Moreover, courts should take
129. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/112A-14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995).
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seriously the deprivation of the guaranteed right to enjoy property that
will result from the issuance of a criminal protection order.
Failing to allow for victim input in the process of defining the con-
ditions of pretrial release may be a further representation of the paternal-
istic standpoint courts have traditionally taken towards the victims of
domestic violence and may be a further impediment to empowerment.
Furthermore, an institutional presumption against taking seriously any-
thing an alleged victim might say in support of the defendant seems
especially unfair.
Legislatures should take care in defining the class of persons pro-
tected by remedial legislation to ensure they are in the first instance
deserving of protection only afforded via the criminal protection statute.
Likewise, legislation should not deny release to all defendants in domes-
tic violence cases as a matter of course, but should allow for courts to
make a reasonable factual inquiry into the specific reasons for denying
bail to a defendant, even where the purpose of such denial is to allow for
a cooling off period.
Concerns for equal protection for victims of domestic violence are
certainly justified. Both the judiciary and the executive branches must
be careful to ensure that traditional victims of domestic violence are pro-
tected in the same manner that all crime victims are protected.1 3° The
same standards should be applied to legislatures and judges who make
and apply the laws related to domestic violence. Defendants charged
with domestic violence should not receive a unique array of limited con-
stitutional rights, but should be afforded the same protections that other
similarly situated defendants are entitled to receive.
The result of a critical examination of the pretrial process of the
domestic violence defendant will, ideally, lead to a judicial response that
considers and meets the needs of all the actors in a particular case, and
that fashions a remedy best suited to aid in eradicating such violence
from our society.
CHRISTOPHER R. FRANK
130. See, e.g., Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding as
actionable an equal protection claim by a woman who was repeatedly stabbed and kicked by her
husband in front of a number of police officers who failed to arrest the attacker until he finally
headed for his victim once again as she lay on an ambulance stretcher). The jury awarded the
victim $2.3 million, with the trial judge asserting "[a] police officer may not knowingly refrain
from interfering and may not decline to make an arrest simply because the assailant and the victim
are married. Such an action on the part of the officer is a denial of equal protection of the law."
Quoted in BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 70, at 158.
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